



## SAVUNMA VE HAVACILIK SANAYİ İHRACATÇILARI BİRLİĞİ

**Sayı:** 58224147-TİM.OAİB.26.ARG4.2022/36-4271  
**Konu:** Moldova Talep Yazısı

Ankara, 19/04/2022

### SİRKÜLER (2022/Savunma)

Sayın Üyemiz,

Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığından alınan bir yazıda, Moldova Güvenlik Kuvvetlerinin savunma sanayi ürünlerine yönelik ihtiyaç listesindeki taleplere cevap verebilecek firmaların Dumitru Chisnenco (+31639449998 dahili:1672) ile görüşmeleri ve gelişmeler neticesinde Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığını (İrtibat: N. Merve KOÇAK, [mkocak@ssb.gov.tr](mailto:mkocak@ssb.gov.tr)) bilgilendirmeleri belirtilmektedir.

Bilgileri ve gereği rica olunur.

Özkan AYDIN  
Genel Sekreter

**EK:** İhtiyaç Listesi

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LIST OF NEEDS OF THE BORDER POLICE			
Nr	Objective	Needs	Estimated budget (euro)
<b>Green Border surveillance</b>			
		Off-road vehicles (4x4 traction)	3 000 000
		Mini UAVs	30 000
		Mid-range/Fixed wing UAV systems	195 000
		Portable thermal vision cameras	1 242 000
		Fixed thermal vision systems	1 600 000
		Mobile thermal vision surveillance systems	800 000
		Intervention boats	300 000
		Handguns (CZ P10C with holster)	105 000
		Submachine guns (CZ Scorpion Evo 3A1)	300 000
		Ammo for Handguns and Submachine guns 9x19	22 000
		Personal protection equipment (bullet proof vests, helmets)	110 000
		Anti-drone systems	1 350 000
		Detection and alert devices	500 000
		Hand-held metal detectors	10 000
		<b>Subtotal cost:</b>	<b>9 564 000</b>
<b>Document control and informational security</b>			
		Computers for the endowment of the Border Crossing Points (first and second line of border control), Regional Directorates, BCP Airport "Chisinau"	225 000
		Portable document reading stations (Regula 8333M)	220 000
		Documents check kiosk for Airport (Regula 9018)	60 000
		Servers for apps and web services (HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10 Plus)	75 000
		Servers for DataBase (HPE ProLiant DL380 Gen10 Plus)	30 000
		Storage for DataBase (HPE MSA 2062)	30 000
		<b>Subtotal cost:</b>	<b>640 000</b>
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>10 204 000</b>

LIST OF NEEDS OF SECURITY AND PUBLIC ORDER				
Nr	Objective	Needs	Quantity	
Improve and extend communication and capacity building for the internal security ecosystem		Estimated budget (euro)	Quantity	
1.	a. Ensure communication both between personnel acting on the field and between them and the decision makers	Portable TETRA radio station	3000	1800000
		Mobile TETRA radio station	1500	1200000
		Mobile units to extend Tetra coverage to the eastern border via satellite	10	2500000
		Tetra tab with windows	1500	6000000
		IT&C equipment package (laptops, PC, printers)	8000	8000000
		Body-worn cameras	10000	4500000
		Smartphone	3000	900000
		Personal protection equipment (bullet proof vests, helmets)	1000	550000
		Thermal cameras	100	600000
		Night view cameras	4000	8000000
		Arms and ammunitions (package)	1	23250000
		Trucks and off-road vehicles	500	13500000
		Special vehicles, incl armored	30	4000000
		Tactical uniforms	15000	10800000
Drones	10	500000		
<b>Subtotal cost:</b>			<b>86.100.000</b>	
2.	Improve knowledge, decision making process and common operational picture	<b>Situational analysis, incident reporting and resource planning</b>		
		Enterprise resource planning software (package)	1	5500000
		Data collection tools, incl OSINT and GEOINT (package)	1	8000000
		Common operational picture - IT data aggregation platform following NIEM standard (package)	1	6800000
		Enhance CCTV capabilities and smart media analysis (package)	1	10000000
		Incident reporting and mission planning software (package)	1	7000000
		Digital evidence - collection, storage, and management (package)	1	9000000
<b>Subtotal cost:</b>			<b>46 300 000</b>	
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>132 400 000</b>	

LIST OF NEEDS OF THE EMERGENCY SITUATIONS			
Nr	Objective	Needs	Estimated budget (euro)
		<b>Capacity building</b>	
		<i>Off-road vehicles (4x4 traction)</i>	100
		<i>Fire trucks</i>	400
		<i>Capacity truck</i>	10
		<i>Vehicle for transporting petroleum products</i>	10
		<i>Multifunctional tractor with shovel, brush, trailer, tank for use in the field of natural disasters and logistics works</i>	10
		<i>Tetra radio systems</i>	1000
		<i>Mobile units to extend Tetra coverage to the eastern border via satellite</i>	5
		<i>Tetra tab with windows</i>	500
		<i>IT&amp;C equipment package (laptops, PC, printers)</i>	1200
		<i>Thermal cameras</i>	100
		<i>Night view cameras</i>	400
		<i>Tactical equipment</i>	1500
		<i>Smartphone</i>	500
1.	Enhanced capacities of emergency situations		750000
			2200000
			4000000
			700000
			350000
			800000
			1250000
			2000000
			1200000
			600000
			800000
			1080000
			150000
			51.880 000
	<b>TOTAL</b>		

## Moldova Internal Affairs

### Fundamentals

1. For Moldova, like for most other countries, the humanitarian crisis comes on top of pandemic, energy, and inflation developments but unlike other countries Moldova has particular energy dependencies and has faced, in the last 3 years, increased depopulation and brain drain.
2. Social-economic environment has hindered the competitiveness of public sector, as a result, entry barriers for public servants, especially law enforcement, had to be lowered to attempt to compensate the vacant positions.
3. Keeping up the same cadency, let alone facing an increase on activities, generates high security risks for Moldova and the region, including EU, due to the fact that fatigue, emotional stress, continuous tension will generate errors, misinterpretations or overreactions.
4. Tactical and operational data needed for decision making processes is mainly collected manually and it is interpreted with low end software (.xls). For instance, there are limited capacities for cybercrime investigations, no common operational pictures and no geospatial capabilities.

### Key situational developments

5. Since the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2022, all resources of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been directly or indirectly involved in providing assistance for managing the migrant flows,
6. Evaluation of actual performed activities has pointed out the main pillars for crisis management:
  - a. capacity building, with particular focus on:
    - i. need to communicate – specifically infrastructure (communication paths)
    - ii. need to motivate personnel
    - iii. need for maintenance of existing infrastructures
    - iv. need for urgent and on-the-spot medical care
    - v. need for personal protection
    - vi. need for urgent response
    - vii. need for strengthening first-line responders' aid
    - viii. improve scanning, detection, and imagery
  - b. process design, with emphasis on:
    - i. proficient management of migrant facilities (accommodation, meals, goods of strict necessity, etc.), supply chains, storage, medical
    - ii. efficient balance between rapid and thorough person and vehicle checks
    - iii. implementation of automatic IT systems redirecting human resources to perform other urgent tasks
    - iv. situational analysis
    - v. risk assessments

Risks – the current context enhances the following risks in the field of internal affairs:

1. Impossibility to ensure communication both between personnel acting on the field and between them and the decision makers.

a. Context:

- i. Undeveloped secure mobile communication infrastructure: except for Chisinau (capital city) and the western border line between Moldova and Romania, the rest of the country and particularly the eastern areas at the border of Moldova and Ukraine have scarce to no secure mobile communication
- ii. Not updated secure mobile communication infrastructure: even for the areas where there is coverage there were no investments in maintenance of equipment, consequently some experienced failures or deficient capabilities
- iii. The status quo is that law enforcement and rapid intervention ecosystems use mobile commercial service providers and cell phones for managing cases. Already, telecommunication companies have experienced lower signal powers and even interruptions

b. Mitigation tactics:

- i. Quick interventions upon existing secure mobile communication infrastructure, as a result the existing infrastructure will function at maximum capacities and without interruptions
- ii. Extend the communication infrastructure to cover the border areas between Moldova and Ukraine, it could be done rapidly by the deployment of dedicated vehicles equipped with signal repeaters, antennas, fiber optics and satellite for Tetra communication

c. Risk assessment:

Category	Scale	Observations
probability	very likely	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• more migrants coming to Moldova = more users</li><li>• people use social media = more bandwidth for streaming data</li><li>• energy discontinuity = interruptions of commercial telecommunication</li></ul>
Impact	very high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• interrupted chain of command</li><li>• suspended synchronization between human resources</li><li>• dependance only on landlines</li><li>• disrupted media content sharing (i.e., unable to send photos, etc.)</li></ul>

2. Altered internal security environment and reduction of trust in public safety:

a. Context:

- i. Human resources stretched beyond their physical and psychological limits: MIA had to double and triple the patrols and missions with particular focus on the border line and border proximity. Consequently, personnel from other units in the country have been sent to the eastern part of Moldova
- ii. MIA for the past 3 years registers high turnovers: social-economic conditions have not contributed to the attractiveness of the law enforcement community, as a result there is significant dynamics which hinders the organizational development and the learning processes
- iii. Increased rate of border crossings means reduced processing and less person and security checks, as a result fugitives can escape the country, persons can be trafficked, illegal or valuable goods can be imported or exported. Already, persons carrying large amounts of currency (especially USD) have been reported. In some cases, the persons wanted to declare the cash and in other situations they were discovered by the border guards
- iv. Dynamic legal provisions translating in reduced rights and freedoms of persons or strict management of services and goods will create opportunities for setting-up, boost or re-profile organized criminal groups
- v. More money in the house and on the streets people's pockets since the impulse of collecting cash from ATM, liquidating deposits and the inflow of money citizens bring from Ukraine represent valuable incentives for criminals to organize
- vi. Disruption of supply chains in food and goods partially caused by more demand can cause public order disturbances, looting, destruction of stores, violence
- vii. Hybrid and asymmetric threats in the form of (online) misinformation, language of nationalism, lifestyle uncertainties, religious or political bias

b. Mitigation tactics

- i. Hire new personnel: set-up funding schemes for recruiting. Former law enforcement employees could be motivated to return to duties for a limited period
- ii. Offer expertise on crises management and change management by sending experts with various profiles (border checks, management of migrant facilities, organize supply chains, social assistance, including people with special needs, file in assistance requests to donors, etc.) not only to offer professional help but also to perform the tasks as most of encountered situations are relatively new to Moldovan public servants
- iii. Introduce motivational packages for employees involved in current mission to compensate for the expenses and the time spent away from the family, to assist the spouse in balancing working and family time

- iv. Use of IT applications: jobs which needed human interventions might be automatized and human resources could be used in other areas (i.e., enterprise resource planning instruments, mobile incident reporting software, etc.)
- v. Deployment of technology to assist personnel: increase the number of CCTV cameras and add new capabilities to the system by implementing automated change detection, expand the capabilities for media content and analysis to investigate crimes captured on cameras. This approach can be used in cities, at the border line, at migration temporary facilities and in remote areas. It will have positive impact on protection of public spaces, of goods (including the ones of and designated to migrants)
- vi. Inhibit corruption risks: increasing the number of body-worn-cameras to cover the entire patrols on duty as deterrence for illicit deeds
- vii. Increase information exchange between Moldova and western countries since authorities in Ukraine are less focused on law enforcement measures. There is a growing need to collect, compile and analyse data from all sources of information

c. Risk assessment:

Category	Scale	Observations
probability	likely	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the longer it takes for the situation to stabilize, the more opportunities (cash, value) and time for planning for organized crime</li> <li>small disruptive events can have a ripple effects in multiple internal affairs, hospital care and social domains</li> </ul>
impact	very high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>decrease of public trust in the Government, particularly in its ability to manage the crisis</li> <li>diminished perception of safety in houses and on the streets</li> <li>sudden outburst of (extreme) violence</li> </ul>